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1 Many,  if  not  most,  people  get  angry  when  they  disagree,  particularly  when  they
disagree about values. Already in Plato, we find the idea that, unlike in cases where
evidence is comparatively easy to attain – i.e. when disagreement is about numbers,
about magnitudes, or about weight –, disagreement about “the just and unjust, good
and evil,  honourable  and dishonourable”  (Plato,  Euth.:  7d)  is  what  typically  incites
“enmity and anger” (ibid.). Questions of value, i.e. questions that are of moral and/or
political significance, are precisely the questions that make people disagree vigorously
(Midgley 1980: 180). While this view is held through time, there is less agreement about
the normative evaluation of such anger. 1
2 Is it a good, maybe even necessary reaction for a person to get angry when something
they value is threatened or destroyed? Or is anger in such situations bad, maybe even
irrational? As I will  show, both views are defended in the literature and have some
plausibility.  However,  I  argue  that  more  can  be  done  about  anger  than  simply
evaluating it as is. It can be turned into something of communal value.
3 Importantly, normative discussions of anger do not subscribe to one theory of emotion.
Basic emotion theories (see, e.g. Srinivasan 2018: 15) contrast with evaluative judgment
theories (e.g. Nussbaum 2015, 2016); social constructivism is endorsed (see, e.g. Sorial
2017: 122); and the expression of emotion and experience of emotion can come apart
(see, e.g. Bommarito 2017: 2; Sorial 2017: 121-2). While this mirrors the diversity within
the philosophy of emotion, it inspires me to do something about anger that is more
pragmatic, by which I mean: something that is informed by what I think people should
want to make of anger rather than by what they, implicitly or explicitly, think that
anger essentially is. In what follows, I make explicit the normative commitments of such
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a  pragmatic  approach  to  anger  and  propose  to  turn  anger  into  passionate
disagreement. The pragmatists I am going to draw on are not known experts on anger.
However,  their  views  on  affectivity  (see  Hookway 1993,  2003;  Trout  2010;  Cojocaru
2018)  and  on  community  (see  Anderson  1997)  are  central  to  my  interest  in  the
epistemic role of anger. 
4 To motivate and anchor my project, I first reconstruct two prominent views of anger
through  a  virtue  epistemological  lens.  I  introduce their  qualities  as  well  as
shortcomings  for  understanding  the  epistemic  role  of  anger  when  people  disagree
about moral  and political  values.  Next,  I  develop my own proposal:  to  turn violent
disagreement  into  one  that  is  passionate.  I  borrow  ideas  from  pragmatism  that
preserve the qualities of the views discussed within an interpretative framework that
relies on community-oriented sentiments which function as intellectual virtues. These
help people regulate their anger to allow for communal problem-solving. I will use an
example throughout. I conclude with addressing three worries.
 
1. Two Views of Anger in Contemporary Philosophy
and their Problems
5 The contemporary philosophical literature that stands mainly in the Western, analytic
tradition nicely reflects the fact that people are in two minds about anger and its role
in public life. On the one hand, anger is sometimes seen as good. I call this view “anger
as an apt reaction to injustice”2 because it entails the idea that anger provides people
with quick access to moral and/or political beliefs,  with no necessary regard to the
consequences of acting upon these beliefs. On the other hand, anger is sometimes seen
as bad. I call this view “anger as road to perdition in moral and political life”3 because it
entails  the  idea  that  anger  distorts  the  formation  of  beliefs  that  are  the  basis  for
civilised political action, and very much focuses on the consequences. 
6 Prima facie, both views are plausible. Now, I am going to reconstruct them by using a
virtue  epistemological  distinction  (1.1.)  to  show that  their  proponents  do  not  take
anger to be the same kind of state. They are talking past each other. I also suggest that
these views are epistemically at least problematic, if not vicious (1.2.), though I offer
my  criticism  in  a  constructive  manner.  My  own  proposal  builds  on  the  plausible
elements of these views while adding both a concern for the varieties of anger and an
epistemic community commitment in the spirit  of  philosophical  pragmatism. These
need to be heeded before and during the experience of anger if anger is to function well
in public life.
 
1.1. Anger as a Faculty vs Anger as a Character Trait
7 Virtue  epistemologists  are  concerned  with  the  virtues  needed  for  acquiring  good
beliefs.  Such virtues can be conceived of as “faculties” or as “character traits” (see
Axtell 1997; Turri, Alfano & Greco 2017). Faculty-virtues are those sources of belief on
which we rely as a kind of sensor: we rely on the faculty of eyesight to acquire beliefs
about  objects  around  us;  accordingly,  this  conception  of  virtue  is  called  virtue
reliabilism. Alternatively, character trait-virtues are those dispositions we exercise in
our efforts to acquire beliefs and for which we can be praised, or for the lack of which
we  can  be  reprehended:  we  are  responsible for  the  conscientiousness  or  open-
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mindedness and, vice versa, for the sloppiness or narrow-mindedness with which we
approach  questions;  accordingly,  this  conception  of  virtue  is  called  virtue
responsiblism.4 
8 When anger is seen as an “apt reaction to injustice,” it is taken to be a faculty, a source
of  information.  On that  view,  there are facts  in  the world that  “call  for” an angry
response. Such facts have generally to do with the threat to or destruction of value,
more specifically with forms of injustice. The apt recognition of value problems relies
on such responses. Not responding angrily to such facts is at best a sign of apathy and
at  worst  due  to  false  consciousness.  Now,  the  question  is  whether  there  are  such
normative facts. 
9 Imagine  a  park  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  that  is  a  designated  area  of  ecological
conservation. One day, we hear that trees in this park have been cut and there are signs
that some of the protected animals who live there have been killed. The anger that
arises in the community responsible for the park seems a natural response to such
destruction of value. Regardless of its metaethical explication, it is a normative fact
within that community that nothing that goes contrary to the concept of “ecological
conservation” ought to take place in that park. The community has converged on the
view that ecological conservation is a or of value, maybe a common good, otherwise the
park would not have been so designated. 
10 Just  as  faculty-virtues  enable  knowledge,  anger  enables  people  to  appraise  value
problems. Indeed, emotional protest and calls for better protection of common goods as
well as for public inquiry (see Brady 2016) are an essential part of public life. The view
that people who are confronted with threats to or the destruction of value ought to rely
on their anger as a faculty to voice their concerns is characteristic of some scholarship
in  the  context  of  social  movements  (see,  e.g.  Lorde  1997  [1981];  Tessman  2005).
Importantly, though, the value of an angry response might not lie in its consequences,
i.e. whether it is productive, but in its aptness (see Srinivasan 2018: 9).5 This view, then,
can leave strategic questions unaddressed.6 What they eventually achieve to do about
them is a different question.
11 This view is supported by the figure of speech “in virtue of.” We would understand
perfectly well if someone at the scene said: “In virtue of my angry response to the sight of
an elephant carcass missing its tusks, I knew that that was wrong!” The person might
not exactly know the consequence for her or for the community – having to raise this
issue with the authorities or to search for the poachers. However, amidst this
normative uncertainty, that much – that that was wrong – is clear in virtue of the anger
that serves a faculty. The epistemological view that emotions mimick foundations (see
Hookway 1993) dovetails nicely with this idea and adds a pillar to the bridge that leads
from the philosophy of emotion into the field of virtue epistemology. 
12 At the same time, anger is an admittedly unreliable faculty for at least three reasons.
First, while anger makes us attend to certain things, it can also make us fail to attend to
the right things because we may be obsessed with the object of our anger (Hookway
2003:  80).  Second,  our  anger  might  supervene  on  false  beliefs.7 Third,  a  clouded
disposition/mood  can  trigger  anger  by  chance.  Therefore,  I  suggest  distinguishing
proximate and ultimate objects of anger. If one happens to find the poachers next to the
elephant carcass, it seems accurate to think of them or their actions as the proximate
object of one’s anger. However, if one were to focus one’s anger solely on them, one
might fail to achieve much, because poaching is a moral problem that entails further
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structural, political issues (Duffy et al. 2019). Venting one’s anger at individual poachers
is likely to be, at best, superfluous and at worst vicious.8 
13 The negative view of anger as “road to perdition in moral and political life” follows
from such worries. For those who value human effort, in particular when it comes to
one’s emotions,  the positive view of anger as “apt reaction to injustice” misses the
point of what it means to be virtuous in the sense of becoming virtuous through self-
control. Instead of quick, hot, retributivist reactions, a level-headed, forward looking
approach is advocated. How would that play out in my example?
14 Let us assume that one hasn’t encountered the poachers on site but the news comes in
that they have been caught and are far from feeling guilty. They are angry, too, and
they contest the idea that ecological conservation is a common good. They claim that
what the community has been fencing off as a way of “protecting” the environment is
part of their livelihood.9 They argue that they have a right to the forest in order to
continue their traditional ways of life.10 We now have anger facing anger, and another
frame of reference is needed in which to evaluate these claims responsibly. While in the
grip of anger, such a careful inquiry looks doomed. Accordingly, another philosophical
strategy is to acknowledge anger as a sign that something is wrong, but then to quickly
transition to cooler emotions. Normal anger11 is seen as a problematic way of dealing
with information.
15 Consequently,  this  view of  anger  as  “road  to  perdition  in  moral  and  political  life”
conceives of anger mainly in terms of its consequences and these are,  in the main,
negative.  Responding  to  the  threat  to  or  destruction  of  value  angrily  is,  if  at  all
necessary,12 a  transitional  phase  in  which  one  signals  (to  oneself  or  others)  that
something is wrong, and at worst, when continued and systematic, a sign of a deep
character flaw.13 To return to my example, on this view, anybody upset about what has
happened in  the  park  is  entitled  to  feel  angry  if  she  must.  Maybe  the  community
accepts that anger is deliberately staged and has a particular role to play in politics.
However, one should transition into a state of concern for future welfare, justice, or the
common  good  as  soon  as  possible.  Unrestrained,  normal  anger  engenders  anger,
leading to a situation in which hotheads continue to question ever more elements of
the normative community consensus, potentially resulting in a threat to the political
institutions  themselves.  This  view  has  received  renewed  attention  in  the  work  of
Martha Nussbaum in particular (see Nussbaum 2015, 2016) and is supported by scholars
who emphasise political friendship (see Silvermint 2017) and/or deliberative politics
(see Sorial 2017). 
16 Through  this  virtue  epistemological  lens,  it  becomes  clear  that  these  different
philosophers  are  not  talking about  the same thing:  anger  is  either  a  good,  reliable
faculty or a bad, irresponsible character trait, at least as it occurs in normal human
beings.14 The “road to perdition in moral and political life”-view builds on the idea that
humans can regulate their emotions, which makes them profoundly unlike a faculty
like seeing or hearing.15 The idea of taking responsibility for the development of one’s
intellectual  character  is  at  the  heart  of  virtue  responsibilism,  which  emphasises
conscientiousness, open-mindedness, or charity. Generosity, a sense of justice, political
friendship, and a commitment to deliberation fit neatly into this list. Anger, then, is not
a virtuous character trait, but a vicious one, which needs to be controlled by proper
character trait-virtues and its epistemological role is minimal.
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1.2. Some Shortcomings and Two Problems
17 Reconstructing part of the debate on anger in virtue epistemological terms suggests
that the reason why people are in two minds about it has to do with the fact that they
are not talking about the same thing: for some, full blown anger is a faculty, for others,
it  is  a  character  trait.  Two  further  problems  attach  to  both  views  because  they
presuppose what I call the stereotypical view of anger: a phenomenally “hot” state of
mind that involves venting, hysteria, threats, and abuses.
18 Arguably,  the man with the red face,  leaning across the table,  his carotids swollen,
raising his voice, is going to disagree with me rather profoundly over the values in
question if we are having an argument. Indeed, once we have arrived at the stage of a
full blown, violent argument, we are likely too late in the game to make use of the
epistemic potential of anger, which is: to offer hypotheses about moral and political values of
which other members of one’s community might not be aware. However, this only goes to
show that philosophical attention is consumed by this stereotypical view and that is
problematic  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  involves  prejudice  about  the  person  who  is
experiencing anger.  Second,  it  makes us  overlook the many faces  of  anger,  i.e.  the
variations of  angry experience that  may play critical  epistemic roles,  going beyond
signalling that there is a problem. 
19 Given the stereotype of anger as that force which transforms otherwise sensible people
into essentially irrational, retributivist, archaic, blood-thirsty and uncivilised villains
(see e.g. Nussbaum 2016: 1-5, chap. 2; 2015), it is easy to suggest that “these people”
ought  not  to  be  listened to.  Angry  people  have  nothing  to  contribute  to  value  inquiries
precisely because they are out of their minds. However, the judgment that people who “look
angry” won’t be able to deliver any meaningful information or can’t be trusted in their
judgment is a prejudice, one likely of the kind that the testimony of people of colour
cannot  be  trusted,  which  Miranda  Fricker  identifies  as  “testimonial  injustice”  (see
Fricker 2007).16 This is the first problem with the stereotypical view.17 This stereotype
represents only one possible form of what anger can look like – and only one epistemic
function (signalling a problem). 
20 This leads to the second problem. Think of the movie 12 Angry Men,18 in which 12 male
jurors deliberate the case of an 18-year-old boy accused of murder and who approach
the  case  and  the  arduous  deliberation  in  very  different  emotional  styles  (e.g.
deferential  and humble,  or  brash and biased,  or  stern and analytical).  We find the
stereotype of anger in the raging businessman and disappointed father who is the last
to vote “not guilty” (played by Lee J.  Cobb).  Now, if  the boy was indeed guilty,  this
behaviour is what defenders of the view of anger as “apt reaction to injustice” would
have to find apt, since there is the threat to the value of justice if the boy is acquitted.
In contrast, defenders of the view of anger as “road to perdition in moral and political
life” would turn away in horror. These two options would be all there is to the role of
anger in such a situation of normative uncertainty. 
21 However, the movie is called 12 Angry Men and not One Angry Men, Nine Lovers of Justice,
and Two Who Just Don’t Seem to Really Care. Anger has many faces, to which one needs to
pay attention in order to get a full sense of its epistemic potential. There is the cold
anger that motivates the inquirer to keep investigating the situation until all the facts
are in, fostering perseverance and conscientiousness. There is the anger coupled with
incredulity that a particular injustice could at all be true that will motivate the inquirer
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to suspend judgment, fostering healthy scepticism. There is the anger coupled with
grief  that  invites  others  to  finally  pay  attention  to  what  is  going  on,  fulfilling  a
communicative role in making the problem accessible to others.19 Being aware of these
variations helps appreciating states that tend to get dismissed from epistemic business.
22 Also,  simply  asking for  transition into  a  concern for  future  welfare,  justice,  or  the
common good is problematic, because precisely these normative notions are not set in
stone and, in the situations in which anger occurs, uncertain. To see how, going back to
the  park  example  helps.  The  second display  of  anger  (the  one  by  the  poachers)  is
important and eye-opening: to the problem of green colonialism (see, e.g. Mbaria &
Ogada 2016), to the actual power disparities that can exist underneath any presumed
community consensus, and so on. At the same time, the precise contours of the value
conflict over the park and its legitimacy are still not clear. While the community seems
to disagree, then, over ecological conservation contra traditional ways of life, it is easy
to imagine a third group that is already latently angry because its concern is not taken
seriously: say the protection of all animals in the park, not just of charismatic species
like the elephant. Attempts at settling the situation that would include limited use of
the forest will be met by opposition and angry protest by them. It is not difficult to
come  up  with  even  further  parties  (or  individuals)  who  take  issue  with  yet  other
aspects of the situation that had not been accounted for.20 
23 What we have in situations of violent disagreement, then, is a chain reaction of anger.
In order to evaluate which anger is useful, anger cannot be taken at face value. Not
every expression of anger reliably detects a real wrong. People can be even justified in
their  experience  of  emotions  but  still  mistaken  (see  Deonna  &  Teroni  2012).  The
problem  does  not  go  away  by  merely  stating  that  the  virtuous  anger  is  the  one
expressed by the virtuous person who is characterised by the fact that she is committed
to already acknowledged values, e.g., to an Aristotelian view of political friendship (see
Silvermint  2017),  to  deliberative  democracy  (see  Sorial  2017),  or  to  specific
praiseworthy  or  virtuous  concerns  (see  e.g.  Bommarito  2017).  This,  arguably,  is
circular. In contrast,  the point is to tap into anger’s potential to identify threats to
values that are not already acknowledged. 
24 I want to stress that people may be right to react angrily to the normative uncertainty
in  a  situation  that  might,  after  thorough  investigation,  yield  new  political  values,
constellations, and concerns. After all, and quite in line with the standard pragmatic
view of a problematic situation,  their habits of going about their world are disturbed,
challenged, endangered. The situation is indeterminate in the sense that it is not clear
how to go on from here. And problem solving, i.e. an inquiry, must begin. In that sense,
then,  at  least  within  democratic  communities,  any  anger  must  be  considered  a
hypothesis  as  to  what  the  problem  is,  involving  an  attitude  towards  solving  the
problem. Whether the hypothesis and attitude are sound is open to interpretation and
investigation.  That  way,  the  complexity  value  conflicts  display  can  be  embraced:
communities move from what people, initially, took to be the problem (the missing
trees and animals in the park) on to the real problem (the articulation of which needs
to account for everyone affected by the normative uncertainty). 
25 Arriving at the complete picture of the value conflict can be stated more technically.
Insofar as the respective value is the formal object of the emotion (see Teroni 2007;
Deonna & Teroni 2012), it is important to remain open to the experience of further
anger  in  order  to  account  for  everything  that  affects  anyone  involved.  This  has
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important implications for the two extant views. Those who conceive of anger as “apt
reaction to injustice” must make explicit how a community can know in advance whose
anger features a correct formal object, whose cause is righteous and whose is not, in
order to avoid the risk of blind partisanship. Those who conceive of anger as “road to
perdition in moral and political life” must realise that one should not try to change the
formal object at will (and with it, both the emotion and the subject) because this would
be abandoning the epistemic potential of anger. By simply defending the prevailing
community standards, one runs the risk of moral smugness: communities might exhibit
a  lack  of  emotional  understanding  that  would  allow  them  to  assess  the  situation
comprehensively.  Also,  trusting  the  institutions  too  much can  stand  in  the  way  of
improving  them.  Again,  moving  towards  the  love  of  justice  or  sense  of  political
friendship that affirms the status quo without hesitation risks not tapping into the
critical potential of anger.
 
2. Pragmatism, Anger, and Emotions in Inquiry
26 I argue that communities can adopt a pragmatic approach to anger in order to make full
use of its role in mapping value conflicts. This involves focussing on what one wants to
make of anger rather than focussing on what anger essentially is. For pragmatists, anger
is an epistemic problem, a problem of misunderstanding. Charles Sanders Peirce said:
“‘I do not understand you,’ is the phrase of an angry man.” (Peirce 1992a [1868]: 44).
The particular problem about not understanding each other comes out in John Dewey’s
statement:  “To  fail  to  understand  is  to  fail  to  come  into  agreement  in  action;  to
misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes.” (Dewey 1988 [1925]: 179). Being
angry, then, is a problem, because it prevents people from acting together. Since moral
and political life depends on people acting together under mutually accepted norms,
the breakdown of these shared habits is unsettling.21 
27 Pragmatism offers a cognitivist theory of emotion (see, e.g. Savan 1981; Cojocaru 2018)
that allows to reign in the unreliable aspects of anger in a way that involves more than
just reason as a counterpart. It involves specific other emotional dispositions – namely
the sentiments of faith, love, and hope – that function as intellectual virtues. These
commit the individual to a particular notion of community, and combine reliabilist and
responsibilist elements, which can be harnessed in the regulation of anger. To better
understand this, I next explain the role community plays in inquiries, and I introduce
the  concomitant  virtues  that  are  both  intellectual  and emotional.  I  then introduce
“passionate  disagreement”  as  an  alternative  to  the  other  two  views  of  anger.  Its
advantage is that it appreciates the varieties of anger and avoids potential epistemic
injustice. A disadvantage is that it broadens the scope of the problem of emotions in
public life because it becomes clear that anger cannot be treated in isolation. However,
this brings the philosophical analysis and evaluation of anger closer to the realities of
moral and political life. For people are rarely, if ever, just angry.
 
2.1. Affectivity and Community-Oriented Intellectual Virtues in
Inquiry
28 A  pragmatic  intellectual  virtue  is  a  habit  of  cognising  and  reasoning  that  entails
appropriate  actions.  It  is  tied  to  the  pragmatist  view  of  belief  as  habit  of  mind,
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involving some  action  (see  Peirce/CP  5.398). E.g.  to  show  open-mindedness  is
equivalent to having the habit of not jumping to conclusions. These habits combine
reliabilist  and  responsibilist  elements  because  of  the  different  affective  states  that
come into play.22 
29 For pragmatists, it is a mark of intellectual virtue to experience the right kind of doubt
and to ask the right kind of questions (see Hookway 2008; Peirce/CP 5.370). Equally, it is
the defining character trait of the inquirer that her epistemological concerns should
not  be  about  herself  alone,  but  that  they  “must  embrace  the  whole  community”
(Peirce/CP 2.654).  In  the acquisition and exercise  of  intellectual  virtues,  then,  both
kinds of affective states are needed. To have the faculty of reliably experiencing real
doubt rather  than  letting  oneself  be  fooled  by  what  Peirce  famously  called  “paper
doubts” (Peirce/CP 6.498) is a habit in the sense of a disposition to take some questions
or problems seriously and others not, and it accords with the reliabilist emphasis on
virtues that are constitutive of knowledge. To have the character trait of having hope in
the community of inquiry rather than letting oneself be fooled by epistemic pessimism
(see Peirce/CP 1.405) is a habit in the sense of a disposition to persevere in the face of
problems  and  it  accords  with  the  responsibilist  emphasis  on  virtues  that  enable
knowledge in the first place. 
30 The idea of intellectual virtue hinges on the possibility to distinguish good and bad
intellectual habits by looking at their consequences for the community. Good habits are
those that provide inquirers with stable, epistemically productive ways of cognising
and reasoning. They help tracking the truth (immediately, or in the long run) because
of their community commitment.23 Indeed, when pragmatists are talking about inquiry,
they  are  talking  about  community  at  the  same  time. Acknowledging  the  limited
resources,  chances,  and  biases  an  individual  inquirer  has,  one  accepts  that  the
individual is the site of potential error (see de Waal 2006). However, when in doubt, i.e.
whenever confronted with a problem, one is not entirely left by one’s own devices.
Rather,  people turn to others because one must hope that,  in pooling one’s efforts,
chances are higher that one finds out how things are (see Hacking 1991) and partakes
in the growth of reasonableness (Trout 2010: 39-40). Peirce postulated a strong nexus
between  sociality  and  logicality,  forcing  anyone  to  accept  as  default  position:  that
anybody else’s opinion is  “quite as good as his own” (Peirce/CP 5.378) so that “the
problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community”
(ibid.). 
31 Such  humble  doubtfulness  which  is  of  political  significance  (see  Anderson  1997)  is
fostered  by  three  specific  character  traits  that  Peirce  called  “logical  sentiments.”
Elucidating the nexus between logicality and sociality, Peirce mentioned that a good (in
my  sense:  virtuous)  inquirer  is  characterised  by  an  “interest  in  an  indefinite
community,  recognition of the possibility of  this  interest  being made supreme, and
hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity” (Peirce 1992b [1878]: 150).
These are intellectual versions of the (theological) virtues of faith, love, and hope (see
Hookway 1993: 166-7). That inquirers are marked by such community commitment is
crucial in distinguishing this ideal community from the community forces at play in the
other methods of fixing belief that Peirce discusses (authority, a priori).24 Applied to the
problem of regulating anger, it is important that, ultimately, the anger ought not to be
just about the individual self.25 
 
Turn Anger into Passionate Disagreement?
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
8
2.2. Anger’s Future as Passionate Disagreement
32 Pragmatic intellectual virtues hinge upon well-functioning affective states and involve
both  reliabilist  elements  (detecting  valuable  questions)  and  responsibilist  elements
(regulating  inquiry  by  directing  the  attention  toward  the  epistemic  good  of  the
community). What does that mean for anger? Can angry responses count as valuable
sources  of  information and be  indicative  of  a  character  that  is  useful  in  inquiry?  I
believe that is the case. 
33 I agree with the two views of anger discussed on the reliabilist point: anger can be an
important  sign that  something is  wrong.  However,  my proposal  to  turn anger  into
passionate disagreement is designed to avoid the shortcomings introduced in 1.2.: that
a  stereotypical  view of  anger  is  perpetuated that  is  eo  ipso neither  apt  nor  merely
transitional. While I aim to cover a wide range of emotions that are often disqualified
from inquiry,26 the only qualifying element is that the intentional object of the emotion
is not only relevant for just one self. If the distinction between “private” and “public”
was not so coarse and hadn’t historically cut off a range of concerns that were indeed
relevant for the whole community by labelling them as “private,” it would make sense
to say that the qualifying condition is that there is a public dimension to the issue at hand.
Hence, for lack of a better term, I will say that an other-regarding concern is central to
the kinds of anger that ought to be used in moral and political inquiries and this other-
regarding  concern  distinguishes  what  I  call  passionate  disagreement  from  personal
frustration, even if severe.27 
34 When we get angry, what happens, from an epistemological point of view, is that we
receive new information. The people who receive the news about what has happened in
the park come to know that there is a problem, that things are not running smoothly;
some people will know that directly in virtue of their own angry response; others will
take the anger of others as indicative of that much. 
35 Often  when  confronted  with  another  person’s  anger,  we  tend  to  interpret  this
disagreement in the sense that the person28 who is disagreeing with us is contesting
what  we  take  as  a  fact  about  the  values  involved:  the  poachers  don’t  see  the
environmental value in the forest, but its use value; the animal advocates don’t see the
animals as resources, but as deserving protection of their lives and liberties.29 
36 From a pragmatic perspective,  the forest and the animals can be valued in all  such
ways. However, these values are practically incompatible, and the goal of moral and
political inquiries is to find out what ought to be valued. The different perspectives and
angry experiences need to be interpreted; they cannot be taken at face value but need
to enter communal inquiry as hypotheses that may be accepted or refuted. They need
to be transformed in light of the epistemic community commitment. I assume that a
pragmatically objective answer to the normative uncertainty at hand, i.e. an answer
that holds true for everyone potentially involved, can be found (see Bakhurst 2013;
Heney 2016). However, along the way, disagreement of this kind has the potential to
become  violent.  To  instead  pave  the  way  for  passionate  disagreement,  I  offer  the
following four pragmatic considerations. 
37 The first  pragmatic  consideration is  that  there  may be  reasons  for  a  disagreement
turning violent that operate at a meta-level. For instance, one might not trust that all
members of the community are trying to find out how things really are.30 Not only
particular losses of, or threats to, values can create the uncertainty that incites anger,
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but  also  doubts  concerning  the  motives  and  intellectual  virtues  of  the  opponent.31
People sometimes doubt their opponents’ anger both in terms of reliably pointing to
severe wrongs and in terms of being genuine, in the sense that it is regulated by an
epistemic  community  commitment.  For  example,  if  the  poachers  come  to  assume
racism as one of the driving forces behind the efforts to protect the park in the first
place, this is likely to further infuriate them. They cannot trust that the community
outrage is identifying the values of everyone implicated in the situation. Hence, they
cannot trust that it will be used to further inquiry into what is best for the community
as a whole. Once there is reason to believe that someone is not intellectually virtuous –
which means, too, that she is not genuinely expressing her emotions –, serious doubts
concerning her epistemic abilities, including her anger, arise.
38 Another pragmatic consideration is that anger might transcend an existing framework
of  communal  values  incorporated  by  its  institutions.  Let  us  assume  that  the  park
community also took the risk of adopting an energy technology that can cause severe
environmental  damage if  not  properly surveyed,  but if  properly surveyed,  provides
comparatively clean and cheap energy. A hazard occurs at the plant. If there is reason
to believe that it was solely due to human error or technical failure, getting angry is of
little use. However, if it turns out that there was already a lack in conscientiousness
with respect to the security issues one would have hoped the community had put in
place, anger might be much more useful than a sense of justice: precisely because the
institutions did not work in controlling the practice, there is little reason to appeal to
them now. 
39 Importantly though, the pragmatic concern for the varieties of anger provides more
options to enact anger than the stereotype does. While the “anger as apt reaction to
injustice”-view  would  probably  call  for  angry  protests,  and  the “anger  as  road  to
perdition”-view  might  grant  those,  but  then  shush  the  protesters  and  insist  that
community  officials  do  their  job,  the  idea  of  passionate  disagreement  allows  for
different ways in which anger can contribute to the necessary inquiry. There is the cold
anger fostering perseverance and conscientiousness that might motivate someone to
start  proceedings  against  the  company  that  provided  the  technology  at  an
international  level,  a  complicated undertaking which requires  everything but  a  hot
head.  Alternatively,  maybe the foreman at  the plant  experiences incredulous anger
fostering  healthy  scepticism  because  he  feels  he  knows  that  everyone  has  worked
according to  protocol;  he  will  suspend judgment  and go through everything again,
potentially  detecting  that  the  plant  had  been  deliberately  sabotaged.  Also,  people
directly affected by the damage who are struck with more grieving anger fostering
communication  and  accessibility  might  motivate  others  to  support the  inquiry  by
whatever means (attention, resources, compassion). 
40 Moreover,  if  people  learn  to  acknowledge  more  than  just  the  stereotypical  anger,
something can be done about the fact that anger often seems unproductive. Hence,
another pragmatic consideration is that people tend to have views on emotions: the
person who gets angry might be the reason for contempt in the person who thinks of
herself  as  sober-minded,  and the sobriety in the other may be the reason for even
increased  anger  in  the  angry  person.  However,  if  people  subscribe  to  the  idea  of
passionate disagreement, a non-judgmental attitude to other people’s anger is in order,
and even a division of emotional labour in situations of value disagreement becomes
conceivable.  Some people might indeed be better equipped with an anger that  is  a
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source of information (if potentially alarmist), while others might be better at coolly or
grievingly  transforming  such  concerns  into  public  inquiries.  To  acknowledge  and
understand such different emotional types rather than dismissing them might enable
communities to harness a multitude of perspectives instead of enacting stereotypes.32 
41 A final pragmatic consideration concerns the tendency to assume that it is typically
more or less clear who is entitled to his or her anger (and will be heard) and who is not
(and  will  be  shut  down).  The  anger  of  the  disadvantaged  tends  to  be  viewed  as  a
legitimate  means  of  socio-political  struggle  and  the  anger  of  the  privileged  as
oppressive.  While  this  may  be  so  in  some,  maybe  even  most  of  the  situations,
privileging the anger of the disadvantaged nevertheless limits the potential of anger to
feature comprehensively in the analysis of the problem. It is precisely the potentially
sectarian nature of  anger that makes some groups form against others (see Jaspers
2017: 203) and the problem then is that the community commitment shifts. Moreover,
the (uncomfortable) possibility is lost that even a privileged person may have reasons
to get angry, if only because her perspective has to be part of the problem if she is to be
part of the solution. 
42 This  brings  me  back  to  the  distinction  between  proximate  and  ultimate  objects  of
anger. Clearly, a privileged donor of the park (maybe even influenced by subconscious
racist and/or misanthropist feelings) in her angry reaction to said news constitutes a
formidable proximate object of anger. What is needed, though, is an honest, loving, and
hopeful  inquiry into the mechanisms of  such deep frictions in a community.  These
mechanisms and forces must be seen as the ultimate objects of anger and subject to
more lasting efforts than scapegoating one (potentially highly problematic) person. The
epistemic community commitment might require that “moral solidarity” be extended
even to that privileged person who effectively (if unreflectively) acts as an oppressor
(see Harvey 2007: 33-5). Appropriate efforts would allow for forms of disagreement that
engage  pragmatic,  but  critical  common  sense  (see  Trout  2010,  chap. 5)  and  bring
underlying misapprehensions to the surface in order to be corrected. 
43 When people disagree violently about moral and political values, stereotypical anger
tends  to  be  expressed  while  “agreeing  to  disagree”  because,  presumably,  and
particularly in this day and age, everyone is entitled to their own values (as expressed
in  the  emotional  reactions)  and  opinions  –  full  stop.  Passionate  disagreement,  in
contrast,  treats  values  as  something  upon  which  a  community  must  converge.  It
requires to treat emotions as information that needs to be subject to scrutiny in order
to assess it as adequate or inadequate. It transcends the impasse the two other views of
anger  have  arrived  at  by  combining  their  insights  into  what  anger  might  be and
transforming it into something that can be used.
 
3. In Conclusion: Three Potential Problems with
Passionate Disagreement
44 Maybe  we  feel  we  really  shouldn’t,  but  many  of  us  get  angry  when  we  disagree,
particularly when we disagree over moral and political questions. Broadly two views on
this fact dominate the contemporary philosophical debate on anger. My goal has been
to point  to  their  commonalities,  their  differences,  and  their  shortcomings  from  a
social-epistemological perspective informed by pragmatism. I have argued that there is
reason to believe that anger – understood as that what results from moral and political
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uncertainty and leads to a failure to understand each other and, hence, to a failure to
act together – can help understand which values are threatened and to identify the
roots of moral and political uncertainty. Therefore, it is neither easy nor advisable to
dispel it. 
45 At the same time, taking anger at face value has proven to be potentially unreliable,
and treating it as transitional is potentially unjust. In response, I have suggested that
communities can regulate and use the variety of  angry experiences in situations of
moral and political conflict; this I have called “passionate disagreement” and I have
elucidated  four  pragmatic  considerations  that  go  along  with  it.  From  an
epistemological  perspective,  passionate  disagreement  combines  reliabilist  elements
(detecting the right questions about value) with responsibilist elements (primarily the
commitment  to  a  community  of  inquirers  bound  by  certain  sentiments).  From  a
phenomenological  perspective,  it  avoids  the  stereotypical  view  of  anger  and  thus
unleashes the full epistemic potential of various kinds of anger, such as the cold anger
that  fosters  perseverance and conscientiousness,  the incredulous anger  that  fosters
healthy scepticism, or the grieving anger that fosters communication and accessibility
and motivates  others  to  support  the inquiry.  Passionate disagreement offers  a  new
angle on value conflicts that can lead to considerable normative uncertainty in the
public  realm;  rather  than  agreeing  to  disagree,  people  can  engage  in  meaningful
dissent  and,  in  the  course  of  it,  might  be  able  to  grow as  a  community.  However,
readers  might  see  problems  with  this  proposal,  three  of  which  I  want  to  raise  in
concluding. 
46 First, one might wonder whether what I am suggesting here fits what most would still
recognise as anger. However, the concern with protecting a particular kind, maybe the
stereotypical kind, of anger seems unnecessarily conservative. While there may be no
historically and culturally independent “fact of the angry matter,” it is a matter of fact
that  there  is  a  cluster  of  affective  states  that  originate  in  moral  or  political
disagreement, and these are characterised by yet another fact, and that is that they
tend to be disqualified from epistemic business. Emotion terms do not neatly capture
them, and they may include forms of irritation, extreme worrying, grief,  despair or
hate etc. At present, political and moral inquiries are not successful in dealing with
them by just giving them a bad name and excluding those experiences, or by taking
them at face value. From a pragmatic perspective, something needs to be done about
that. If, in doing so, we end up in a world with no stereotypical anger left, I am not sure
that would be a problem.
47 The second problem involves hardened attitudes.  Could it  be that people who train
their anger as passionate disagreement – who continuously look for and monitor value
conflicts  to  feed  them  back  into  the  community  –  will  come  across  as  bitter  or
unforgiving? This is an important worry, and the “anger as apt reaction to injustice”-
view tends  to  bite  that  bullet  and  accept  the  existence  of  “burdened  virtues”  (see
Tessman 2005; for a critical view, see Silvermint 2017). This not entirely undramatic
self-understanding  can  seem  odd  to  some,  and  I  would  hope  that  the  focus  on
community in my account of passionate disagreement helps avoid that the quarrelsome
person can self-style herself as a martyr when nobody else shares her cause. However,
Peirce did argue that one ought to be unselfish and willing to sacrifice oneself for the
good  of  the  community.  Could,  then,  the  individual  inquirer’s  peace  of  mind  be  a
legitimate  self-sacrifice?  Shall  some  members  of  a  community  be  asked  to  expose
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themselves continuously to the most painful moral and political situations so that they
learn to see and report? While this might not always accord well with the demand to be
humble, or to be hopeful, I do not think it is entirely unreasonable – lest communities
learn to  deal  with  anger  in  ways  that  leave  everyone all  too  comfortable  with  the
already known problems, and hence too ignorant.
48 Finally, the third problem concerns the importance of community. If I place so much
emphasis on it, isn’t there a risk of conservatism, even of suppression of minorities or
particularly  progressive  individuals?  First,  any  actual  community  that  ignores  or
suppresses particular experiences of anger that are not just egotistical is clearly acting
contrary  to  the  epistemic  community  commitment.  Also,  the  duty  to  be  critical  of
oneself and others is a corollary of the virtue epistemological position adopted here. At
the same time, an effective change in moral and political views is indeed premised on
the whole (or a significant proportion of the) community converging upon new beliefs
and establishing new habits of valuing things and acting together. Pragmatists might
not have been the first to acknowledge that old habits die hard, but they have taken
this very seriously. Hence, not only individual will and insight but also the communal
workings of  inquiry and the role emotions play in moral and political  change have
come into focus. If, therefore, my approach to anger in moral and political life is found
guilty of some structural conservatism, I can only hope that it will, in the long run,
have  proven to  have  erred  more  often  on  the  side  of  caution  than not.  Given the
potential  of  anger  to  wreak  havoc  on  the  moral  and  political  life  of  communities,
caution might not be entirely ill-advised. 
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NOTES
1. My  goal  is  not  to  provide  or  defend  a  definition  of  anger  with  necessary  and  sufficient
physiological and behavioural conditions, supposedly stable through time and across cultures.
There is reason to doubt that anger has such a “stable referent” (see Dixon 2016; White 2012;
Russell 1994). When I say “anger” I also mean to cover “rage,” “wrath,” “fury,” “indignation,”
“resentment,” “frustration” and other states that may lack an English emotion term, and it may
include forms of “irritation,” “grief,” “despair,” or “hate.” I am concerned with whatever the
emotional reaction to disagreement about values is called.
2. I go into detail below, but I would group the views put forward by Lorde (1997 [1981]), Tessman
(2005), or Srinivasan (2018) under this heading. There may be other ways to see anger as good,
for instance, when it is seen as “healthy” to “vent” one’s feelings. However, I am not interested in
them here.
3. Again, I go into detail below, but I would group the views put forward by Nussbaum (2015,
2016), Sorial (2017), or Silvermint (2017) under this heading.
4. While, since 1997, virtue epistemologists have developed views that combine reliabilist and
responsibilist elements (see Turri, Alfano & Greco 2017), I find this distinction still helpful to
understand the debate on anger.
5. One might think that only negative consequences are a problem. However, at least Srinivasan
(2018: 9) is explicitly rejecting all consequences: “Whether anger is an apt or fitting response to
the world does not turn on the consequences,  good or bad,  of  that anger. Apt anger can be
counterproductive,  making  the  angry  person  worse  off,  and  indeed  exacerbating  the  very
situation at which she is angry.”
6. This is not to say that strategic questions are not addressed. To the contrary, the role of anger
is of prime importance to, e.g., the animal rights movement (Sebo & Singer 2018), and people are,
again, in two minds about the question. What I am saying here is that the positive view of anger
as an apt reaction to injustice does not require to look towards the consequences of anger.
7. Maybe we have been misled by, e.g. social media and we are now either missing information
about the reality or about the intentions of the people who did what angers us.
8. One could be led to make value judgments that are beside the point: everything about these
persons, even their feelings of guilt or fear, could be seen as yet another reason for anger. This
would be a generalizing form of anger, which borders on contempt. For the view that contempt
need not be generalizing, see Bell (2013).
9. Maybe they point to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People to make their case.
10. Suppose that ivory poaching has not been part  of  their  way of  life  previously.  However,
today, they find themselves in a desperate situation, not least because the community relies on a
capitalist economy with insufficient accommodation of their interests. This leaves individuals
with little  choice,  or  at  least  makes it  hard for  them to resist  the temptation of  earning an
exceptional amount of money through poaching.
11. I take “normal anger” to mean “anger that is not curbed or taken control of.” That does not
commit me to the view that it will look and feel the same in different people, nor does it commit
me to the idea that the same set of action tendencies follows from anger. That would be what I
call the “stereotypical view” of anger and I address two of its problems in section 1.2.
12. I  am thinking in particular of  Nussbaum (2016) here,  who conceives of  anger as “always
normatively problematic” (5), even irrational and stupid (249), and recommends a transition into
a concern for the welfare of all, a transition that ideally ought to be sought “soon” (29, 31) after a
maximally “brief” (31) episode of what she makes out to be the defining element of anger: a wish
for payback. 
13. Some people are of course more careful than others not to make such judgments of character
(see, e.g. Silvermint 2017: 11-2). However, it is not clear to me how one can grant somebody his or
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her genuine political rage while at the same time doubting his or her ability (or nobility) to steer
political change. 
14. Again, I am thinking of Nussbaum (2015, 2016) here, who allows for “a major exception to
[her] thesis that anger always involves, conceptually, a thought of payback” (Nussbaum 2016: 35)
and that is what she calls “Transition-Anger” (ibid.: 35-40; Nussbaum 2015: 53-4). It involves an
immediate jump from the awareness of something outrageous into the concern for welfare and
justice, but Nussbaum (2016: 36; verbatim 2015: 54) stresses “how rare and exceptional this pure
forward-looking emotion is.” I will later assume that this is a much more wide-spread option,
given that all emotion involves interpretation.
15. This, again, holds for all emotions, not just for anger, and the notion that we are responsible
for doing so, lies at the heart of an understanding of virtue that conceives of them as an effort to
strike a balance between certain emotional states: say, of courage as the mean between fear and
foolhardiness.
16. This may also be related to the epistemic vice of intellectual arrogance as haughtiness that
Alessandra Tanesini describes in Tanesini (2016).
17. Those who conceive of anger as apt reaction to injustice are not at risk of perpetrating such
epistemic injustice. For them, these agents are out of their mind – and rightly so. They are agents
of social justice, not victims of epistemic injustice. However, phenomenally, anger is understood
in precisely the same way. Thus, the view of anger as apt reaction to injustice at least helps to
nurture the stereotypical view.
18. I am thinking of the 1957-movie, directed by Sidney Lumet, produced by Henry Fonda and
Reginald Rose. 
19. For  sociological  support  of  this  model  of  mixed  emotions,  see  Jaspers  (2017:  208),  with
references to further literature on how combinations of emotions form “moral batteries.” For the
view that anger enables communication,  see White (2012:  8)  and the reference to sociologist
Mary Holmes’ work. 
20. Importantly, not all of the causes will comply with established patterns of what “we” would
perceive as prima facie rightful indignation. “We” can imagine a group of senior men and women
getting angry about the park situation because young women join different parties to the conflict
and,  thereby,  the  public  sphere,  which they had not  been doing in  the  past.  The conflict  is
politicising a previously unpolitical segment of the population and it is argued, paternalistically,
that the young women (possibly: while no doubt able to form a political opinion of their own) will
be met with hostility for voicing it, and since, by simply joining one party or another, they are
not  contributing  any  new  insights,  they  should  rather  restrain  themselves.  “We”  can  also
imagine  an  outraged  white  person  of  European  descent  who  complains  that  the  conflict  is
hurting her newly established eco-tourism business. 
21. Arguably, there is an intricate relation between anger leading to the breakdown of communal
habits and anger being a reaction to such breakdown. The people who were disadvantaged by the
establishment of the park might have had the legitimate expectation that they would have been
consulted  prior  to  the  community’s  decision  to  establish  the  park.  Let’s  assume  they  were
ignored. In turn, they might have gotten angry and that anger might have been an additional
force that motivated the decision to try poaching. I framed the poaching incident as reason for
the normative uncertainty to which the people in the community reacted angrily, because this is
when the public first became aware of a value conflict. It might, and possibly should, have been
possible for the community to see that earlier, but, pragmatically speaking, this is where they
are. Hence, this is where this particular inquiry has to start. The goal is to address the fact that
people have lost the stable ground of common sense or shared understanding regarding some of
the  community’s  values.  Anger  is  important  because  of  its  relation  to  the  threat  to  and
destruction of value. However, as I have argued above, it cannot be taken at face value. It needs
to be interpreted.
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22. Calling  this  an  “intellectual  virtue”  helps  to  show  how  pragmatist  ideas  map  onto
mainstream epistemology.  Moreover,  to  construe  an  analogy  between habit  as  virtue  in  the
ethical realm and habit as virtue in the intellectual realm seems justified in light of Peirce’s ideas
about  the  relation  between  the  normative  sciences,  where  ethics  is  prior  to  logic  (broadly
conceived,  to  cover  epistemology).  Indeed,  Peirce  holds:  “I  do  aver,  and  will  prove  beyond
dispute,  that  in  order to  reason  well,  except  in  a  mere  mathematical  way,  it  is  absolutely
necessary to possess, not merely such virtues as intellectual honesty and sincerity and a real love
of truth, but the higher moral conceptions.” (Peirce/CP 2.82).
23. I should add that this community commitment is precisely not an invitation to what Richard
Rorty called “ethnocentricism.” Peirce’s community is one that is almost paradoxical in that it is
precisely not defined against other communities but by the fact that it continually works towards
extending its boundaries. He says: “This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend
to all races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It
must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bonds.” (Peirce 1992b/
1878: 149).
24. Whether Peirce’s insistence that “[h]e who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole
world, is […] illogical in all his inferences collectively” (Peirce 1992b [1878]: 149) is going into the
same direction of what later epistemologists have called other-regarding virtues (see e.g. Kawall
2002) is unclear. While on that view, it is essential that others benefit epistemically, for Peirce it
is  crucial  that  the  community  benefits  as  a  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  presumably,  the
community can hardly benefit in any other form than through certain individuals benefitting,
too.
25. This ensures that the political agenda will not be set by bullies or emotional tyrants. 
26. See footnote 1.
27. This is why I don’t think that Nussbaum’s claim that the idea of “payback” or “retribution” is
central to anger (Nussbaum 2016: 21-35) applies in such situations. In cases of value conflict,
public anger does not necessarily focus on retribution but may as well  focus on restoration or
reform.  If  wishes for these were to count as signs of retributivism, Nussbaum’s own focus on
future goods would be retributivism in disguise as well. White (2012: 7 f.) is also not persuaded by
Nussbaum’s view. While White, too, offers a distinction between personal, political, and social
anger (White 2012: 2-4), her suggestion that what makes political anger political is that political
agencies are responsible for what I would call the perceived threat or destruction of values begs
the question of what (a) political agency is. It also restricts her discussion to political contexts
with a clear institutional set-up; this makes sense for her interest in anger in democracies and
democratic civic education. However, I want to cast my net more widely.
28. Metaphorically speaking, not only persons can disagree with us: facts can disagree with our
expectations or with each other etc. This is not of my concern here, since, on the side of the facts,
there  are  no  affective  states  involved,  although  we  may  find  ourselves  angered  in  such  a
situation. 
29. There may be nuances, of course. It may well be that the parties can “see” the value the other
party is positing respectively, but that they are not “acknowledging” them as decisive. 
30. Another  reason may be  that  the  situation is  exerting  pressure  upon the  agents  because
something needs to be done, soon. I neglect this aspect here, because, while being a constraint
upon the practical inquiries, it does not strike me as genuinely epistemic. 
31. I believe “doubt” captures what is going on better than assuming that we fear the opponent
(see Lorde 1997 [1981]: 280-1); while doubt can be accompanied by fear or worries, fear seems too
strong.
32. Again, Jaspers agrees concerning political protest when he says: “we need to know far more
about the many forms that anger can take, the many ways it can be displayed” (Jaspers 2017:
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209). To mind comes, too, research on emotional communities (Rosenwein) and in the history of
emotions generally.
ABSTRACTS
People  can  be  outraged  over,  say,  mismanagement  or  fraud  and  motivated  to  address  such
problems; they can, however, also be angry and lash out against the innocent. In addition to such
unpredictability, angry people can seem literally out of their mind. My aim is to render anger
intelligible and productive from a social  epistemological  perspective:  epistemological because I
assume that anger involves value recognition and arouses reflection; social because I assume that
the related values and inquiries involve questions of justice and/or morality. I believe that value
disagreements are set up at  cross purposes if  we disqualify the emotional reactions of  those
whom we judge too unpleasant to understand. However, I also believe that we should not take
anger at face value. My proposal is pragmatic for two reasons. First, and in line with classical
pragmatist  tenets  about  the  role  of  doubt  and  other  emotions  in  reasoning,  it  is  pragmatic
because I think that anger results from moral and political uncertainty and leads to a failure to
understand one another and, hence, to a failure to act together. Second, my proposal is more
concerned with what could be made of anger rather than focussing on what anger essentially is. In
sum,  I  suggest  that  communities  can  regulate  and  use  the  variety  of  angry  experiences  in
situations of uncertainty and conflict about moral and political values; that would be “passionate
disagreement.” I explain four pragmatic considerations that go along with it and address three
problems one might raise in response.
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